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I. INTRODUCTION 
This symposium issue on The Class Action After a Decade of 
Roberts Court Decisions provides perspectives on how the class action 
has fared under persistent Supreme Court scrutiny. Over the past ten 
years, the Roberts Court has repeatedly returned to questions concerning 
class action litigation. Indeed, contributors to this symposium perceive 
an “unprecedented flurry” of Supreme Court decisions regarding the 
class action1 and observe that the Roberts Court has given the class 
action “more frequent and searching scrutiny than has occurred during 
any decade since the modern class action was created by the 1966 
amendments to Rule 23.”2 
The modern class action evokes strong sentiments both from those 
who favor expanding access to aggregate litigation and those who would 
curtail such access. Those favoring the class action champion the 
* Bernadette Bollas Genetin, Associate Professor, The University of Akron School of Law.  I thank
Daniel J. Glass for editorial assistance. 
1. Richard D. Freer, Front-Loading, Avoidance, and Other Features of the Recent Supreme
Court Class Action Jurisprudence, 48 AKRON L. REV. 721, 721-22 (2015). 
2. Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Abides: Class Actions and the “Roberts Court,” 48
AKRON L. REV. 757, 800 (2015). 
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deterrent value in aggregating negative value claims that will not 
otherwise be pursued and the efficiency of permitting plaintiffs to pool 
resources to obtain a realistic chance at success against large defendants. 
There is value for defendants, too, in that class litigation permits the 
defendant to put an end to many claims in a single lawsuit. Many, 
however, have come to view the class suit as “legalized blackmail,” 
arguing that defendants must settle or “stake their companies on the 
outcome of a single trial.”3 In this scenario, defendants facing 
overwhelming liability may settle to avoid the potentially huge 
judgment, even when the odds of losing are quite low.4 There is 
symmetry, however, in the potential losses apportioned to plaintiffs and 
defendants in the class certification contest – the steep potential cost to 
defendants of settlement or a plaintiffs’ verdict at trial parallels the 
substantial loss to plaintiffs when the class action is resolved in 
defendants’ favor, particularly when the claims are too small to warrant 
individual suits.5 The symmetrical potential for tremendous gain or loss 
to plaintiffs and defendants justifies the increased scrutiny class action 
procedure receives. 
The Roberts Court has, to date, issued more than a dozen decisions 
regarding the class action6 and has considered additional cases dealing 
with other types of aggregate litigation.7 The cases cover varied terrain. 
3. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir. 1995).
4. E.g., Robert G. Bone, Walking the Class Action Maze: Toward a More Functional Rule
23, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1097, 1110 (2013); but see Michael Selmi & Sylvia Tsakos, 
Employment Discrimination Class Actions After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 48 AKRON L. REV. 803, 811-
814 (2015) (noting that there are tools to deal with opportunistic plaintiffs and questioning court 
solicitude for what economists, in other scenarios, would view as “irrational” fears of defendants, 
particularly in light of the lack of concern for plaintiffs who lose their claims when courts deny 
certification). 
5. Selmi & Tsakos, supra note 4, at 813 (quoting Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest.,
133 S. Ct. 2304, 2316 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting)). 
6. Dart Cherokee Operating Basin Co., LLC v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547 (2014); Halliburton
Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014); Chadbourne & Parke, LLP 
v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058 (2014); Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. 2304; Oxford Health Plans LLC v.
Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013); Standard Fire 
Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345 (2013); Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. 
Ct. 1184 (2013); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011); Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 
S. Ct. 2368 (2011); Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. (Halliburton I), 131 S. Ct. 2179 
(2011); AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds 
Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010); and Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
559 U.S. 393 (2010). 
7. E.g., Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 134 S. Ct. 736, 739 (2014)
(analyzing a “mass action,” as opposed to a class action, but construing a portion of the Class 
Action Fairness Act); Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1527 (2013) 
(addressing the Fair Labor Standards Act “collective action”). 
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Some of the most visible address the standards for certifying class 
actions under Rule 23.8 Others consider provisions of the Class Action 
Fairness Act (CAFA),9 resolve issues regarding the Federal Arbitration 
Act (FAA) and class action waivers,10 examine standards for certifying 
securities fraud class actions,11 and assess, under the Erie doctrine, 
potential conflicts between Rule 23 and state law.12 
Despite the number of class action decisions it has issued, the 
Roberts Court’s class action jurisprudence is often associated with two 
5-4 decisions, both of which impose limitations on the class action – 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, in which the Court construed provisions 
of Rule 23 to create additional hurdles to class certification,13 and AT&T 
Mobility v. Concepcion, in which the Court broadly held that the Federal 
Arbitration Act preempted state law that would have barred class action 
waivers in arbitration agreements.14 Views of the death of the class 
action, in light of the Wal-Mart and Concepcion decisions, have been 
espoused15 and discarded.16 Professor Mullenix, indeed, has identified no 
fewer than six announcements of the death of the class action in the past 
forty years, including one death attributed to the Roberts Court’s Wal-
Mart and Concepcion decisions.17 She reports, however, that the class 
action survived and, in fact, thrived following each obituary.18 The 
contributors to this symposium sound no death knell based on the 
Roberts Court class action jurisprudence and, in the main, avoid 
characterizing the cases, as a whole, as either hostile or hospitable, 
perceiving a complexity in the large set of decisions that precludes such 
8. E.g., Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1426; Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1194; Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at
2548-49. 
9. Dart Cherokee, 135 S. Ct. at 551; Standard Fire, 133 S. Ct. at 1347.
10. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2307; Oxford Health, 133 S. Ct. at 2066; Concepcion, 131 S.
Ct. at 1740. 
11. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2407; Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1190; Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. at
2719. 
12. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 398 (2010).
13. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.
14. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753.
15. E.g., John Campbell, Unprotected Class: Five Decisions, Five Justices, and Wholesale
Change to Class Action Law, 13 WYO. L. REV. 463, 463 (2013); George Rutherglen, Wal-Mart, 
AT&T Mobility, and the Decline of the Deterrent Class Action, 98 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 24, 25 
(2012); Suzette M. Malveaux, How Goliath Won: The Future Implications of Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 
106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 34, 37 (2011). 
16. Linda S. Mullenix, Aggregate Litigation and the Death of Democratic Dispute
Resolution, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 511, 529-32 (2013). Accord Bone, supra note 4, at 1125; Andrew J. 
Trask, Reactions to Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Litigation Strategy & Legal Change, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 
791 (2013). 
17. Mullenix, supra note 16, at 517-32.
18. Id. at 536.
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overarching generalization. 
The class action decisions of the Roberts Court, like the class action 
process itself, form a complex tapestry. Although the Roberts Court 
decisions regarding class certification and class action waivers figure 
prominently in the contributors’ discussions of the Court’s impact on 
class action litigation, the commentators also acknowledge other, less 
heralded cases as having had substantial impact.19 Some decisions 
strengthen the availability of the class action. Some, decidedly, do not. 
Others weave together analyses that seem to favor the class action in 
some contexts, but not others. From the contributions to this symposium, 
one may draw not so much an overarching conclusion regarding class 
action health, but close study of particular cases and their potential for 
significant impact on class action litigation and a set of recurrent themes 
that cross a number of articles yet evoke differing conclusions. 
One recurrent theme is the institutional role of the Supreme Court 
in establishing class action policy, in its adjudicatory capacity, as 
opposed to the role of the federal rulemakers acting through the 
Enabling Act process.20 In his contribution to this symposium, Professor 
Mark Moller posits that federal rules governing the scope of class 
certification are an integral part of “our system of judicial federalism.”21 
He, thus, suggests that the Supreme Court, when acting in its 
adjudicatory capacity, should adopt the most “cautious, narrowest 
interpretation consistent with the Rule’s text—leaving the decision to 
greenlight more expansive approaches to class certification, and with it 
greater inroads on state autonomy, to Congress and its surrogate, the 
federal rulemaking process.”22 Others, too, have concluded that the 
federal rulemakers, as Congress’s expressly delegated rulemakers, 
19. E.g., Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345 (2013); Smith v. Bayer Corp.,
131 S. Ct. 2368 (2011). Andrew Trask identifies the Knowles and Bayer cases as among the Roberts 
Court decisions that signify the Court’s acceptance of an aggregate theory of the class action, as 
opposed to an entity theory. Andrew J. Trask, The Roberts Court and the End of the Entity Theory, 
48 AKRON L. REV. 831, 851-54 (2015). Professor Mark Moller references the Bayer case as 
pointing to structural separation-of-powers principles that may underlie the seemingly “accidental” 
federalism that results from the Roberts Court’s narrow construction of class certification under 
Rule 23. Mark Moller, The New Class Action Federalism, 48 AKRON L. REV. 861, 874-79 (2015). 
20. E.g., Moller, supra note 19, at 877-78; see also Selmi & Tsakos, supra note 4, at 808-09
(reviewing history of Congress’s passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which extended damages 
for intentional discrimination from “modest” backpay, lost wages, and attorneys’ fee awards, to 
compensatory and punitive awards of up to $300,000 per class member and suggesting that, because 
this change was enacted by Congress, federal courts should have been neutral to class actions 
asserting intentional discrimination, though some were not).  
21. Moller, supra note 19, at 876.
22. Id. at 877.
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should play an important role in creating a “coherent” and “functional” 
theory of the class action through amendments to Rule 23 or in creating 
procedural policy.23 
This ten-year retrospective on the Roberts Court’s class action 
decisions provides a timely opportunity to reflect on the Supreme 
Court’s institutional role in construing the Federal Rules and in creating 
class action policy through decisions construing Rule 23. In April 2015, 
on the eve of the publication of this symposium issue, the Rule 23 
Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (Rule 23 
Subcommittee) released its “conceptual sketches” of amendment “ideas” 
regarding Rule 23 and its conceptual sketches of Committee Note 
“ideas.”24 The Rule 23 Subcommittee also suggested that a fairly 
ambitious time schedule might be possible, which could permit the 
publishing of proposed amendments to the class action rule for public 
comment in August 2016.25 The Rule 23 Subcommittee is currently 
considering possible rule amendments regarding the following class 
action issues: (1) settlement approval criteria; (2) settlement class 
certification; (3) cy pres distributions; (4) dealing with objectors; (5) 
Rule 68 offers and mootness; (6) issues classes; and (7) notice to class 
members.26 
The Supreme Court, meanwhile, has continued to grant certiorari in 
cases involving important class action issues. It recently granted 
certiorari in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez27 to explore issues regarding 
23. E.g., Bone, supra note 4, at 1098-99, 1114-19 (noting that federal rulemakers are better
positioned to obtain and evaluate relevant information and to invite broad participation of relevant 
stakeholders and also suggesting that the rulemakers, to whom Congress expressly delegated the 
task of creating federal rules, should consider but not be constrained by decisions of the Supreme 
Court on nonconstitutional issues); see also Laura J. Hines, The Unruly Class Action, 82 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 718, 723-24, 762-65 (2014) (concluding that decisions regarding the permissible 
extent of issues classes in class actions should be determined through the Enabling Act process, 
which permits both greater access to information and heightened participation by scholars, 
practitioners, judges, and others, and also suggesting that the rulemakers might undertake a 
“holistic” approach to Rule 23); Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, The Supreme Court’s 
Regulation of Civil Procedure: Lessons from Administrative Law, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1188, 1193-94 
(2012) (suggesting that the Supreme Court should defer to the federal rulemaking process, in lieu of 
providing procedural change through Federal Rule interpretation, when, inter alia, presented with 
questions regarding Federal Rules for which it must make “policy pronouncements similar to 
legislative rules, rather than interpretive rules”). 
24. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES, Report of Rule 23 Subcommittee, in AGENDA,
WASHINGTON, D.C., APRIL 9-10, 2015, at 243, 244-86, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Civil/CV2015-04.pdf. 
25. Id. at 244.
26. Id. at 244-86.
27. Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 768 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 83 U.S.L.W.
3637 (U.S. May 18, 2015) (No. 14-857). 
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whether an offer of complete relief to a named plaintiff may moot a class 
action and whether such an offer would moot an action if made to a 
plaintiff before a class is certified. The Court has also granted certiorari 
in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,28 in which the Court will consider whether a 
violation of a federal statute is alone sufficient to create standing or 
whether a plaintiff must show both cognizable harm and the defendant’s 
violation of a statute. A decision on this issue will impact class action 
litigation significantly since class plaintiffs often assert statutory claims. 
Thus, the Supreme Court and federal rulemakers will continue to share 
responsibility for class action policy. 
A second theme that pervades the articles is that, notwithstanding 
the restrictive interpretations of class action certification in some of the 
Roberts Court decisions and the consequent “front-loading” of litigation 
to the class certification stage, class actions continue to be certified in 
significant numbers and some circuit courts continue to issue decisions 
that encourage resolution of large numbers of claims through the class 
action procedure.29 The symposium contributors, thus, conclude that, 
even after the Roberts Court decisions on class certification, class action 
practice remains vibrant. 
The contributors to this symposium focus on the Roberts Court 
class action decisions as a whole; the Roberts Court’s new insights 
regarding the nature of the class action; and the practical impact of the 
Court’s class action decisions. Section II of this Foreword discusses 
articles that offer perspectives regarding the body of class action cases 
decided by the Roberts Court. Professor Freer observes that the set of 
cases includes some decisions favorable to plaintiffs and others that are 
favorable to defendants, but concludes that those favoring defendants 
will have more far-reaching effects.30 Attorneys Paul Karlsgodt and 
Dustin Dow conclude that the Roberts Court class actions cases, as a 
whole, reveal a Court that has passed on opportunities to provide clear 
guidance, has hesitated to issue broad holdings, and has been selective in 
choosing cases it will review.31 
Section III reviews articles that discuss (1) the Roberts Court’s 
perception of the class action and (2) the interplay of federalism 
28. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 742 F.3d 409 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (Apr.
27, 2015) (No. 13-1339). 
29. E.g., Cabraser, supra note 2, at 800-01; Selmi & Tsakos, supra note 4, at 814-17
(discussing the employment discrimination claims alleging intentional discrimination). 
30. Freer, supra note 1, at 721-24; see also infra notes 39 to 69 and accompanying text.
31. Paul G. Karlsgodt & Dustin M. Dow, The Practical Approach: How the Roberts Court
Has Enhanced the Class Action Procedure by Strategically Carving at the Edges, 48 AKRON L. 
REV. 883 (2015); see also infra notes 70 to 86 and accompanying text. 
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principles and the Court’s restrictive approach to class certification 
under Rule 23. Andrew Trask revisits the debate about whether the class 
action should be construed as an “entity” or should be viewed, instead, 
as an “aggregation” of the claims of numerous individuals, as a prelude 
to his conclusion that the Roberts Court has definitively resolved that 
debate in favor of an aggregation model.32 Professor Moller suggests that 
the Court’s restrictive approach to interpreting class certification under 
Rule 23 can be viewed as an “outgrowth of basic separation of powers 
(and federalism) principles,” and, hence, these decisions support the 
view that Congress or its rulemaking delegate, rather than the Supreme 
Court, should control the “federal courts’ role in our federal system.”33 
Finally, Section IV reviews articles that assess the vigor of class 
action litigation in the lower federal courts after the Roberts Court’s 
decisions in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, Comcast Corp. v. Behrend,34 and the 
Court’s securities class action cases. Professor Selmi and Sylvia Tsakos 
preface their conclusions regarding employment discrimination class 
actions that assert intentional discrimination with the observation that 
certification of this type of class has always been difficult. Proceeding 
from that premise, Selmi and Tsakos conclude that the Wal-Mart 
decision seems to have led to a significant decrease in the number of 
such filings, but that the filed cases proceed largely (though not entirely) 
as they did pre-Wal-Mart.35 Elizabeth Cabraser acknowledges that class 
certification is, in light of Roberts Court certification decisions, “more 
rigorous, more protracted, more expensive, and more uncertain,”36 but 
she concludes that the class action has survived and that its “core 
functions” and “fundamental structure” remain largely unchanged.37 Eric 
Alan Isaacson concludes that the Court’s securities class action decisions 
provide “extraordinarily good news” for plaintiffs pursuing securities 
fraud class actions.38 
II. ASSESSING THE ROBERTS COURT CLASS ACTION DECISIONS IN
AGGREGATE 
Two articles survey the Roberts Court class action decisions as a 
32. Trask, supra note 19, at 851-54; see also infra notes 89-98 and accompanying text.
33. Moller, supra note 19, at 882.
34. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).
35. Selmi & Tsakos, supra note 4, at 803-05.
36. Cabraser,supra note 2 at 800.
37. Id. at 800-01.
38. Eric Alan Isaacson, The Roberts Court and Securities Class Actions: Reaffirming Basic
Principles, 48 AKRON L. REV. 923, 925 (2015). 
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group and draw conclusions based on the body of decisions. Professor 
Richard Freer analyzes those decisions, concluding that the opinions are 
not of one piece. Instead, they contain favorable holdings for both 
plaintiffs and defendants. Professor Freer ultimately concludes, however, 
that the cases favorable to defendants are broader and will more 
profoundly affect class action practice. Defense attorneys Paul G. 
Karlsgodt and Dustin M. Dow concede that a number of Roberts Court 
class actions decisions favor defendants. They, nevertheless, perceive 
that the Roberts Court has no philosophical opposition to the class 
action, concluding instead that the decisions reveal a Court that has 
declined many opportunities to impose restraints on the class action and 
that prefers to decide cases on narrow grounds that leave many “gaps to 
be filled by the work-horse lower courts.”39 
In his article, Front-Loading, Avoidance, and Other Features of the 
Recent Supreme Court Class Action Jurisprudence, Professor Freer 
surveys thirteen cases that he includes in the Roberts Court’s 
“unprecedented flurry” of class actions decisions.40 He reaches four 
general conclusions. First, the Roberts Court class action opinions 
contain “some very good news for plaintiffs,” but, second, the news for 
defendants is decidedly better.41 Third, the defendant-friendly decisions 
reveal a “clear trend toward ‘front-loading’ class litigation,” that is, 
toward requiring plaintiffs to “do more and prove more” at the class 
certification stage of a case, which creates higher hurdles to certification 
and imposes higher earlier expenses.42 Finally, the Roberts Court’s 
sweeping approval of class action waivers in arbitration agreements 
permits defendants to avoid many claims entirely, particularly negative-
value claims. Absent aggregate action, Professor Freer reminds, these 
claims will never be asserted.43 
Professor Freer observes that the Roberts Court class action 
decisions favorable to plaintiffs, in the main, resolve issues unrelated to 
the structural elements of Rule 23, thus, limiting their impact.44 The 
plaintiff-friendly decisions focus, with one exception, not on Rule 23, 
but on a litigant’s right to her day in court;45 on fairly narrow 
39. Karlsgodt & Dow, supra note 31, at 886.
40. Freer, supra note 1, at 721.
41. Id. at 722-24, 724-54.
42. Id. at 737-54. See also Linda S. Mullenix, Dropping the Spear: The Case for Enhanced
Summary Judgment Prior to Class Certification, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1197, 1224-29 (2010). 
43. Freer, supra note 1, at 742-48.
44. Id. at 749-54.
45. Id. at 749-53 (discussing Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368 (2011) and Standard Fire
Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345 (2013)). 
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jurisdictional provisions of the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) and 
the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) that permit 
plaintiffs to maintain their choice of state court over federal;46 or on the 
particular, though concededly important, substantive law area of 
securities fraud class actions, in which the Roberts Court decisions 
provided major victories for plaintiffs.47 Recognizing the importance of 
these decisions, Professor Freer, nevertheless, emphasizes that the 
decisions do not apply to class actions generally. 
Professor Freer notes that the Court’s decision in Shady Grove 
Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., by contrast, focuses on 
Rule 23, and the opinion undeniably favors plaintiffs.48 Shady Grove 
considered the branch of the Erie doctrine involving conflicts between a 
federal rule and state law. Thus, Professor Freer observes that the Shady 
Grove decision, too, has limited application because, although it 
construes Rule 23, it applies only in vertical choice of law scenarios.49 In 
Shady Grove, the Court considered whether Federal Rule 23, which 
permits class action certification if the requirements of Rule 23(a) and 
(b) are met, conflicted with a state law that banned class actions in some 
types of statutory claims.50 In the portion of the opinion that attracted 
five votes, the Supreme Court concluded, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, 
that Rule 23 and state law were in conflict.51 In a portion written for a 
plurality of four justices and in which Justice Stevens concurred, thus 
supplying the fifth vote, Justice Scalia concluded that Rule 23(b) is valid 
(and, thus, controls over the conflicting state law) because it is 
procedural, i.e., it “‘really regulat[es] procedure – the judicial process for 
justly administering rights and duties recognized by substantive law and 
46. Id. at 753-54. These cases include Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 134 S.
Ct. 736, 739 (2014), in which the Court held that, in a parens patriae action, the state is the only 
plaintiff, and Chadbourne & Parke, 134 S. Ct. 1058 (2014), in which the Court held that SLUSA 
applies to invalidate state-court class actions only when the challenged fraudulent trading is in 
“covered securities,” not when defendants contend, fraudulently, that the financial instruments at 
issue are backed by covered securities. 
47. In this case, the limited subject matter is the very important area of 10b-5 securities class
actions. The good news for plaintiffs filing securities class action is robust. Among other things, the 
Roberts Court preserved the fraud-on-the-market presumption first articulated in Basic, Inc. v. 
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 
S. Ct. 2398 (2014). Halliburton II, however, does not apply to the panoply of class action decisions, 
but is limited by substantive law. Freer, supra note 1, at 737-42.  
48. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 400 (2010).
49. Freer, supra note 1, at 724-25.
50. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 398. The New York statute at issue precluded class actions for
a statutorily prescribed penalty or minimum payment, unless the authorizing statute expressly 
permitted a class action. Id. at 396 & n.1. 
51. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 405-06.
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for justly administering [the] remedy.’”52 In so concluding, Justice Scalia 
determined that Rule 23 provides a “categorical, one-size-fits-all 
formula for determining when a class action may be maintained,” 
irrespective of the requirements of state law.53 The upshot (based on 
Justice Scalia’s opinion for four justices) is that Shady Grove protects 
plaintiffs by permitting class actions in federal court if the requirements 
of Rule 23 are met, even if state law would impose additional 
requirements.54 Thus, Professor Freer concludes that Shady Grove not 
only favored plaintiffs, it arguably “saved” Rule 23 from “evisceration 
by state law.”55 
The salvific impact of Shady Grove is, however, debatable. It may 
be that, in class action practice, less is more. Part of the continuing 
concern regarding class actions is that class litigation is available 
indiscriminately. Indeed, it is available in some instances in which the 
aggregation of claims through the class mechanism may be detrimental 
because, for example, it results in overdeterrence based on the combined 
effects of statutory minimum penalties and the availability of attorneys’ 
fees in class action litigation. Notions of comparative institutional 
capacity argue in favor of permitting the primary substantive lawgivers, 
Congress and state legislatures, to determine whether, as a matter of 
substantive law, enforcement of statutory claims through the class 
mechanism is beneficial or detrimental.56 Moreover, to the extent that 
legislative bodies do not determine the appropriateness of class action 
enforcement when creating statutory claims or that their determinations 
are disregarded, federal courts may impose general limits on all class 
52. Id. at 407 (Scalia, J., plurality decision) (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14
(1941) and citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464 (1965); Burlington N. R.R. Co., 480 U.S. 1, 8 
(1987)). 
53. Bernadette Bollas Genetin, Reassessing the Avoidance Canon in Erie Cases, 44 AKRON 
L. REV. 1067, 1118 (2011). 
54. But see Helen Hershkoff, Shady Grove: Duck-Rabbits, Clear Statements, and
Federalism, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1703, 1712-14 (2011) (reviewing subsequent decisions and concluding 
that, following the “narrowest grounds” rationale, some courts are construing Justice Stevens’s 
concurrence as controlling and are enforcing state restrictions on class actions if there is clear 
expression by the state legislature that the provisions are substantive); Karlsgodt & Dow, supra note 
31, at 887, 902-03. 
55. Freer, supra note 1, at 722, 725 (citing Linda S. Mullenix, Federal Class Actions: A
Near-Death Experience in a Shady Grove, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 448 (2011)). 
56. See Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang & Herbert M. Kritzer, Private Enforcement, 17
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637, 673-74 (2013) (suggesting that Congress should consider, in each 
private enforcement framework it creates, “the potential impact of class litigation on the attainment 
of regulatory goals,” including whether “class litigation might yield inefficient over-enforcement,” 
and also suggesting disapproval of Shady Grove’s failure to acknowledge state legislative 
limitations on the class action). 
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litigation in response to court conceptions of overdeterrence caused by 
use of class action litigation to pursue particular substantive claims. This 
would also impede goals of Congress and state legislatures. In the long 
run, accommodating legislative determinations – at both the federal and 
state level – regarding when class litigation is appropriate may do more 
to save the class action than preserving the transsubstantive application 
of Rule 23.57 Such deference might also more faithfully reflect the limits 
on federal rulemaking imposed by the Rules Enabling Act, which 
provides that federals rules “shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any 
substantive right.”58 
Notwithstanding the decisions that benefit plaintiffs, Professor 
Freer concludes that the defendant-favorable decisions are richer. First, 
many of the defendant-favorable decisions construe provisions of Rule 
23 and, thus, apply generally to class actions filed in federal court.59 
Second, these decisions construe certification requirements to create 
increased obstacles to class certification,60 and they also “front-load” 
57. See Genetin, supra note 53, at 1126-36 (proposing use of a “serious doubts” model of
avoidance in construing potentially conflicting Federal Rules and state law that would privilege 
separation of powers principles and, as a consequence, protect federalism interests). There have also 
been inroads on Justice Scalia’s conclusion on behalf of a plurality in Shady Grove that Rule 23(a) 
and (b) establish the sole requirements for class certification. Justice Stevens, who provided the 
necessary fifth vote in support of the validity of Rule 23 in Shady Grove, filed a separate 
concurrence in which he agreed that Rule 23 was valid, but he interpreted the substantive rights 
limitation of the Rules Enabling Act to preclude Federal Rules from “displac[ing] a state law 
[regarding class certification] that is procedural in the ordinary use of the term but is so intertwined 
with a state right or remedy that it functions to define the scope of the state-created right.” Shady 
Grove, 559 U.S. at 423 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). See also Freer, 
supra note 1, at 725 n.25. Though admitting the possibility that sufficiently substantive state class 
action requirements must be honored notwithstanding Rule 23(a) and (b), Justice Stevens created a 
fairly high bar to determining that a state limitation on the class procedure is intertwined with 
substantive law. See Genetin, supra note 53, at 1122-24; Hershkoff, supra note 54, at 1712-14 
(concluding that, on the “narrowest grounds” rationale, some courts are construing Justice Stevens’s 
concurrence as controlling and are enforcing state restrictions on class actions if there is clear 
expression by the state legislature that the provisions are substantive). See also Karlsgodt & Dow, 
supra note 31, at 903 (suggesting that Justice Stevens’s opinion may, on “narrowest grounds” 
rationale, ultimately be more influential than that of Justice Scalia).  
58. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012); see also Genetin, supra note 53, at 1135-36.
59. Freer, supra note 1, at 723, 734-37, 752-53, 754-55.
60. In Wal-Mart, the Court raised the hurdles to class certification (1) by limiting the
situations in which plaintiffs may obtain monetary relief in a Rule 23(b)(2) class primarily to 
situations in which the proposed monetary relief is readily calculable or flows naturally from 
injunctive relief sought, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2560 (2011); and (2) by 
creating a higher standard for commonality under Rule 23(a)(2). See Freer, supra note 1, at 726-35. 
The majority in Comcast, likewise, construed Rule 23 narrowly indicating that Rule 23(b) 
requirements are subject to the same rigorous proof requirements as Rule 23(a) requirements; that 
“[if] anything, Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance criterion is even more demanding than Rule 23(a);” 
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013); and that the plaintiff’s damages theory 
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litigation in the class action case “procedurally” by increasing proof and 
evidentiary requirements for certification and, hence, increasing the cost 
of obtaining certification.61 The decisions do so, moreover, through their 
holdings and also through numerous judicial “hints” that do not rise to 
the level of holdings, but will likely be treated as authoritative.62 
These near-holdings, Professor Freer observes, contribute to 
procedural front-loading by providing that certification is not a question 
of pleading, but requires “convincing proof” of the Rule 23(a) and (b) 
requirements; that plaintiffs must provide proof of Rule 23 certification 
requirements even if there is overlap with merits issues; that expert 
evidence regarding certification likely must meet Daubert 
requirements;63 and that defendants may rebut plaintiffs’ evidence in 
support of certification.64 
Finally, Professor Freer concludes that the “most profound” change 
wrought by the Roberts Court class action jurisprudence arises from the 
Supreme Court’s uncompromising application of the Federal Arbitration 
Act (FAA) to enforce waivers of class litigation in arbitration contracts, 
including contracts of adhesion.65 In these cases, Professor Freer 
emphasizes, the Court “relentlessly” protects an individual’s right to 
bargain away – even by contract of adhesion – the ability to pursue class 
arbitration even when it would be prohibitively expensive to pursue 
individual arbitration.66 The results of the Concepcion decision at the 
state level are two-fold, Freer concludes: As a substantive matter, it 
permits defendants to violate with impunity rights that are enforced only 
through negative-value claims.67 As a matter of state authority over local 
enforcement options, it prevents states from using private enforcement, 
must match its theory of liability. See Freer, supra note 1, at 735-36 (summarizing the “significant 
pronouncements” of Comcast). 
61. Freer, supra note 1, at 737-42. Professor Freer notes that Halliburton II also front-loads
litigation “substantively” by requiring that evidence for and against the presumption of fraud-on-
the-market be presented at the certification stage.  
62. Id. at 726.
63. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-94 (1993).
64. Freer, supra note 1, at 732, 734-37. Wal-Mart’s judicial “hints” include also that (1) if
individual issues predominate, “there is ‘the serious possibility’ that due process requires that class 
members be given notice and the opportunity to opt out,” id. at 728 (quoting Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 
2559); and (2) trial-by-formula might run the risk of abridging defendant’s substantive rights in 
violation of the Rules Enabling Act. Id. at 729-30 & n.66. 
65. Id. at 742--48 (discussing AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011)).
66. Id. at 745, 747-49 (discussing the Italian Colors decision). In Concepcion, the Court did
not reach this issue, Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1740, but Professor Freer concludes that the 
Concepcion Court implies that class action waiver will be upheld even if individual claims are not 
feasible. Freer, supra note 1, at 747-48. 
67. Freer, supra note 1, at 745.
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in addition to or instead of, administrative or criminal enforcement to 
enforce consumer or other statutes.68 At the level of conflict between 
substantive federal statutes and the FAA, moreover, Roberts Court class 
action waiver decisions also elevate the right-to-contract focus of the 
FAA over substantive policies in other congressional statutes, absent 
affirmative congressional indication that aggregate litigation is 
permissible.69 
Defense attorneys Paul F. Karlsgodt and Dustin M. Dow 
acknowledge the breadth of the Roberts Court’s class action waiver 
decisions, but they search, in vain, for similar broad and authoritative 
rulings in the Court’s remaining class action decisions.70 Karlsgodt and 
Dow perceive, in their review of the Court’s class action portfolio, a 
Court that “has nibbled away at the rough edges of class-action 
procedure while passing on chances to dictate more drastic reform.”71 In 
their article, The Practical Approach: How the Roberts Court Has 
Enhanced Class Action Procedure by Strategically Carving at the 
Edges,72 Karlsgodt and Dow conclude that the Roberts Court opinions 
tend (1) to resolve narrow legal issues, rather than create sweeping class 
action law;73 (2) to endorse positions previously taken by lower federal 
courts;74 and (3) to bypass opportunities to clarify important class action 
principles, which, they emphasize, include Court decisions to deny 
certiorari on important class action issues.75 
Karlsgodt and Dow view the landmark Wal-Mart v. Dukes case as 
illustrative of the Roberts Court’s propensity to decide cases narrowly 
and on grounds previously established in the lower federal courts. They 
68. Id.
69. Id. at 748-49.
70. Karlsgodt and Dow, likewise, agree that the Roberts Court’s liberal approval of
contractual waivers of the right to proceed in a class format in the arbitration context has impacted 
the viability of claims in which the defendant contracts directly with the potential plaintiffs, such as 
in consumer and employment cases. Karlsgodt & Dow, supra note 31, at 894, 896-97. 
71. Id. at 885.
72. Id. at 883.
73. Among other examples, Karlsgodt and Dow identify the Court’s Class Action Fairness
Act (CAFA) cases as providing guidance on narrow legal issues. In Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU 
Optronics Corp., 134 S. Ct. 736 (2014), the Court held that parens patriae actions are not “mass 
actions” as defined by CAFA. Similarly, the Court concluded, in Standard Fire Ins. Corp. v. 
Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345 (2013), that a plaintiff may not prevent removal of an action by 
stipulating, before a class is certified, that the class will agree to accept less than the amount in 
controversy, but the Court failed to address the additional issue of the standard of proof by which 
the defendant must establish that the plaintiff class seeks more than the amount in controversy. See 
Karlsgodt & Dow, supra note 31, at 889-90, 898-900. 
74. See infra notes 79-82, and accompanying text.
75. See infra notes 84-86, and accompanying text. 
710 AKRON LAW REVIEW [48:697 
concede that Wal-Mart established a new and “helpful” tone, one that 
“emphasiz[es] the need for a rigorous analysis to ensure that the 
plaintiffs can prove common issues through common evidence,” and that 
the Court provided “foundational” language that has served as the basis 
for many subsequent certification decisions.76 Wal-Mart also raised the 
commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) from irrelevance to a primary 
hurdle between plaintiffs and class certification.77 Karlsgodt and Dow 
hasten to add, however, that even this change did not significantly alter 
the practical challenges of defending Rule 23(b)(3) damage actions since 
Rule 23(b)(3) requires predominance of common issues.78 
They contend, however, that, except for the heightened 
commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2), neither the holdings nor the 
“hints” in Wal-Mart and Comcast broke new ground. Instead, the 
Supreme Court followed the lead of lower federal courts in holding that 
monetary relief available in the Rule 23(b)(2) class is limited;79 that, at 
the certification stage, courts may assess facts that overlap both 
certification and merits issues, notwithstanding the Eisen80 decision;81 
that courts must apply a rigorous analysis to Rule 23(a) and (b) 
requirements, including the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement; 
that courts must apply heightened scrutiny to expert opinions supporting 
certification; and that use of trial-by-formula in the class context may 
not survive scrutiny.82 
Karlsgodt and Dow conclude that defining features of the Roberts 
Court class action decisions are the Court’s issuance of opinions with 
limited holdings83 and its denials of certiorari in cases raising significant 
class issues. They identify the following as among the issues on which 
the Roberts Court has denied certiorari and, thus, failed to provide 
76. Karlsgodt & Dow, supra note 31, at 914, 911-12.
77. Id. at 910-12.
78. Id. at 910.
79. Karlsgodt & Dow, supra note 31, at 909-10.
80. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
81. Karlsgodt & Dow, supra note 31, at 909.
82. Id. at 911-15.
83. Karlsgodt and Dow include the following as among the issues that the Supreme Court
declined to reach: (1) reliability of expert testimony regarding certification in Comcast Corp. v. 
Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013); (2) whether an unaccepted Rule 68 offer of judgment that fully 
satisfies a plaintiff’s claim is sufficient to moot the plaintiff’s claim in a Fair Labor Standard Act 
collective action, see Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1528-29 (2013); (3) 
whether the availability of class arbitration under a contract is a question to be determined by the 
court or the arbitrator, see Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068 n.2 (2013); and 
(4) the standard of proof by which defendants must establish the amount in controversy for purposes 
of removing a case pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act. See Karlsgodt & Dow, supra note 31, 
at 911, 890, 898-901, 914-21. 
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guidance: (1) the propriety of certifying issues classes;84 (2) standards 
governing reliability of expert evidence proffered at the certification 
stage; (3) standards for approval of class settlements; (4) standards for 
the Fair Labor Standards Act “collective action”; and (5) availability of 
cy pres relief.85 Thus, Karlsgodt and Dow conclude that the Roberts 
Court exhibits a tone that encourages class action reform and that it has 
made some limited changes, but they conclude also that the Roberts 
Court has restricted its role by declining, in the main, to play an active 
part in defining the contours of the modern class action.86 
III. THE ROBERTS COURT, THE ENTITY-AGGREGATE DEBATE, AND
FEDERALISM 
Two contributors consider less well-known class action decisions of 
the Roberts Court in the course of providing insights on whether the 
Roberts Court perceives the class action as an aggregate of individuals 
or as a separate juridical entity and whether principles of federalism and 
separation of powers support the Court’s narrow construction of class 
certification standards. Attorney Andrew J. Trask focuses on unanimous 
decisions of the Roberts Court, including Smith v. Bayer Corp.87 and 
Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Knowles,88 to conclude that the Court 
has made a “definitive shift away from the entity model of class actions” 
and has accepted that the class action is simply an aggregate of many 
individual claims.89 This shift, Trask reminds, will impact the nature and 
extent of pretrial discovery, resolution of pretrial motions, settlements, 
and certification decisions.90 In The New Class Action Federalism, 
Professor Mark Moller observes that the Court’s class action cases since 
84. Karlsgodt & Dow, supra note 31, at 9, 914. See also Hines, supra note 23, at 723-24,
762-65 (suggesting that the permissible contours of issues classes ought to be determined by the 
federal rulemakers through the Rules Enabling Act process, rather than by the Supreme Court 
through case law). 
85. Karlsgodt & Dow, supra note 31, at 915-21.
86. Id. at 921-22.
87. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368 (2011).
88. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345 (2013).
89. Trask, supra note 19, at 832. Trask also relies, in concluding that the Roberts Court has
adopted an aggregate view of the class action, on a unanimous, non-class action decision of the 
Roberts Court, Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008), and on the dissenting opinion of Justice 
Kagan (who was joined in her dissent by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor) in Genesis 
Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1532-34 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting). Trask, supra 
note 19, at 833, 850, 856-57. Professor Mark Moller also construes the Bayer Corp. decision to 
reveal the Roberts Court’s perception of the class action as an aggregate of individuals, rather than 
as a separate entity. Moller, supra note 19, at 872-74. 
90. Trask, supra note 19, at 845-49.
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2011 have made certification of nationwide mass tort actions at the 
federal level much more difficult to obtain, which has resulted in a 
decentralization of mass tort litigation and the redistribution of resulting 
cases throughout the federal and state systems.91 This “accidental 
federalism” and the separation of powers principles that fuel this 
federalism are most evident, Professor Moller concludes, in Smith v. 
Bayer Corp., a little-discussed opinion of the Court.92 
In The Roberts Court and the End of the Entity Theory, Trask 
focuses on what he describes as “largely part of a theoretical debate” 
regarding whether the class action should be viewed as an entity that is 
separate and distinct from its members, as asserted in the so-called 
“entity theory,” or whether the class action is simply the largest available 
joinder device, one that permits aggregation of the claims of the many 
individuals that comprise the class action.93 The latter alternative is often 
referred to as the “joinder theory” or “aggregation theory.”94 He traces 
the history of the entity theory from its inception in the scholarship of 
Michigan professor Edward C. Cooper in the 1960s, through the present, 
noting that the entity/aggregate debate has largely played out through 
academic commentary.95 He concludes, however, that the results of the 
debate are anything but academic. 
Courts that conceptualize the class action as a separate juridical 
entity, rather than as simply a joinder of claims of multiple individuals, 
rule differently on litigation issues that arise before a class is certified. 
They tend, Trask notes, to permit greater discovery for plaintiffs than 
defendants, to be more likely to permit substitution of named plaintiffs, 
and to be more likely to reject objections to settlements.96 Trask delves 
into the academic commentary regarding the entity theory of class 
actions to explain that these results obtain because the entity model 
moves the focus from the named plaintiff to class counsel; it provides 
that controversies arising before class certification should be resolved as 
though the class already exists; and it counsels that courts “should err in 
favor of certification since that would be best for the entity.”97 Trask 
then explores a trio of unanimous Roberts Court opinions to conclude 
that the Roberts Court has disavowed the entity theory, at least to the 
91. Moller, supra note 19, at 862.
92. Id.
93. Trask, supra note 19, at 832.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 835-37.
96. Id. at 845-47.
97. Id. at 834.
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extent that the theory provides for treating a class action as a separate 
entity prior to class certification.98 For the Roberts Court, he concludes, 
the class action remains simply an individual lawsuit until such time as a 
court certifies a class – a conclusion that will have major impacts on 
class action litigation. 
In The New Class Action Federalism, Professor Moller suggests 
that the Roberts Court cases that narrowly construe class action 
certification may reveal an “untheorized” or “accidental” federalism that 
works to redistribute claims that would be encompassed in nationwide 
classes back to state and federal forums in the nature of smaller class 
actions and individual suits.99 Indeed, Professor Moller suggests that 
federalism principles – implemented through separation of powers 
constructs that give deference to Congress’s authority to control federal 
lawmaking – may join due process limitations and substantive rights 
limitations as a third restriction on the federal class action.100 Professor 
Moller suggests also that the Court’s deference to separation of powers 
principles, most notably in Smith v. Bayer Corp.,101 may provide a 
principled way to understand the Roberts Court’s restrictive approach to 
class certification. 
In Bayer, the Court examined an application of the Anti-Injunction 
Act (AIA),102 a congressional statute that generally precludes federal 
courts from enjoining ongoing state lawsuits, although it has limited 
exceptions. The district court in Bayer had concluded that the 
“relitigation” exception to the AIA applied, permitting the court to 
enjoin the parallel state class action, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.103 
Professor Moller observes that, in reversing, the Roberts Court recurred 
to interpretive canons that require narrow construction of federal 
jurisdictional statutes, in deference to Congress’s control of federal 
jurisdiction.104 In Bayer, the Roberts Court emphasized that exceptions 
to the AIA had been interpreted restrictively for decades and that any 
ambiguity in applicability of the exceptions should be construed 
narrowly to prevent encroachment on state authority. The Roberts Court, 
thus, deferred to Congress’s primacy in establishing the extent of the 
98. Id. at 849. See also Moller, supra note 19, at 23-24 (citing Diane Wood Hutchinson,
Class Actions: Joinder and Representational Device?, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 459). 
99. Moller, supra note 19, at 2.
 100.  Id. at 20-23. See also Mark Moller, The Checks and Balances of Forum Shopping, 1 
STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 107 (2012). 
101.  Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368 (2011). 
102.  28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2012). 
103.  Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 2374. 
104.  Moller, supra note 19, at 17, 878. 
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federal court’s jurisdiction.105 Professor Moller suggests that the Roberts 
Court’s narrow interpretations of class certification under Rule 23 may 
evince a parallel deference to Congress as the primary lawgiver, 
particularly since broad constructions of the class action rule will 
displace state autonomy in litigation arising from mass events.106 
Concluding that expansive constructions of Rule 23 are “at the very edge 
of the rulemaking power conferred under the Enabling Act,” Professor 
Moller suggests that even federal rulemakers ought to act cautiously and 
ought generally to leave broad constructions of Federal Rule 23 for 
Congress.107 
IV. ASSESSING THE PRACTICAL IMPACT OF THE ROBERTS COURT CLASS
ACTION DECISIONS 
The final three contributions to this symposium assess the impact of 
the Roberts Court class action decisions on employment discrimination 
class actions alleging intentional discrimination, on the 23(b)(3) money 
damages class action, and on open market securities fraud cases. 
Professor Michael Selmi and Sylvia Tsakos collaborate to conclude that 
Wal-Mart did not sound the death knell of employment discrimination 
class actions based on claims of intentional discrimination.108 Plaintiff-
side attorney Elizabeth J. Cabraser reaches a similar conclusion in her 
review of how class action litigation is faring in the federal courts in the 
post-Wal-Mart, post-Comcast, and post-Amgen109 era.110 Finally, in The 
Roberts Court and Securities Class Actions: Reaffirming Basic 
Principles, attorney Eric Alan Isaacson concludes that the Roberts Court 
decisions on class certification in its open-market securities fraud 
decisions have been “particularly agreeable” to plaintiffs.111 
Professor Selmi and Sylvia Tsakos assess the viability of 
employment discrimination class action cases that allege intentional 
discrimination five years after the Roberts Court’s supposed “game-
changer,” Wal-Mart v. Dukes.112 In their article, Employment 
Discrimination Class Actions After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, Selmi and 
Tsakos conclude that Wal-Mart appears to have reduced the number of 
105.  Id. at 874, 879. 
106.  Id. at 875. 
107.  Id. at 877-78. 
108.  Selmi & Tsakos, supra note 4, at 803-05. 
109.  Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013). 
110.  Cabraser, supra note 2, at 757. 
111.  Isaacson, supra note 38, at 924. 
112.  Selmi & Tsakos, supra note 4, at 803-05. 
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case filings and that the lower courts’ analyses of discrimination cases 
vary somewhat from pre-Wal-Mart decisions.113 They also conclude, 
however, that results of the cases that are filed mirror pre-Wal-Mart 
results: Those cases that would have been certified before Wal-Mart are 
likely to be certified in the post-Wal-Mart world.114 
From study of published certification and decertification decisions 
in the approximately five years since Wal-Mart, Selmi and Tsakos 
identify trends in employment discrimination class litigation, and they 
also perceive, in three circuit court decisions, a framework for successful 
assertion of class claims alleging intentional discrimination.115 The 
authors report that published decisions suggest there will be fewer 
nationwide class actions alleging intentional discrimination in cases that 
do not challenge clear employment practices, perhaps none, and that 
such suits will, instead, go forward as smaller, regional class actions.116 
Additionally, as before Wal-Mart, the likelihood of class certification 
will depend on the strength of the claim and on the jurisdiction in which 
the case is filed.117 Finally, class claims alleging subjective employment 
practices may still be certified post-Wal-Mart, though certification may 
depend (as pre-Wal-Mart) on the court’s pre-disposition to employment 
discrimination cases;118 on a court’s distinguishing Wal-Mart based on 
the unique characteristics of the proposed class in Wal-Mart, including 
its enormous size;119 and, on the existence of overarching corporate 
policies that “govern” or frame discretionary employment decisions of 
local managers.120 Thus, Selmi and Tsakos conclude that the impacts of 
Wal-Mart on intentional discrimination class actions, which have always 
been difficult to certify, are tangible, yet modest.121 
Attorney Elizabeth J. Cabraser similarly assesses the health of Rule 
23(b)(3) class actions in the federal courts in light of three Roberts Court 
class action decisions that impact class certification: Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 
113.  Id. at 804-05. 
114.  Id. at 805.  
115.  Id. at 822-28 (discussing McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 
F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 338 (2012); Scott v. Family Dollar 
Stores, Inc., 733 F.3d 105 (4th Cir. 2013); and Stockwell v. City & County of San Francisco, 749 
F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2014)). 
 116.  Selmi & Tsakos, supra note 4, at 805, 829-30. Selmi and Tsakos trace the prior move to 
seeking certification of nationwide classes, in part, to the varying reception of employment 
discrimination classes in different federal circuits. Id. at 807-09. 
117.  Id. at 805, 809.  
118.  Id. at 808, 829. 
119.  Id. at 814. 
120.  Id. at 823-30. 
121.  Id. at 821, 830. 
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Comcast Corp. v. Behrend,122 and Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement 
Plans & Trust Funds.123 In her article, The Class Abides: Class Actions 
and the “Roberts Court,” Cabraser concludes that, following these 
decisions, class certification is “more difficult, more expensive, [and] 
less predictable, across substantive lines,” primarily because of the 
emphasis on creating an extensive factual record and on providing expert 
proof in support of class certification.124 Cabraser also emphasizes that 
the Wal-Mart Court inappropriately imported into “commonality” under 
Rule 23(a)(2), the more exacting requirement of “predominance” of 
common questions that is needed to establish a money damages class 
under Rule 23(b)(3). She, thus, concludes that the Court now requires, 
for Rule 23(a)(2) commonality, the “more exacting” standard of 
“predominance” of common questions that should be reserved only for 
(b)(3) classes.125 Cabraser also objects to the increasingly insistent 
arguments of defendants that plaintiffs must establish proof of damages 
by all class members before certification or that they must establish 
Article III standing of absent class members in an evidentiary hearing. 
She concludes, to the contrary, that Article III standing requirements 
should be “the same for class actions as they are for individual suits” and 
that “class members, like individual plaintiffs, need not prove the merits 
of their claims, or the existence or quantum of damages, as a predicate of 
standing . . . or as [a] prerequisite to class certification.”126 
Nevertheless, Cabraser finds that, post-Wal-Mart and post-
Comcast, some federal circuits are construing the 23(b)(3) requirement 
that “questions of law or fact common to class members [must] 
predominate” over issues that affect only individual members in a 
“practical, functional” manner.127 Rather than requiring that all or the 
majority of issues be common, the circuits undertake a pragmatic, 
holistic assessment of the issues and “focus[] on the utility and 
superiority of the preclusive classwide trial of important common 
issues.”128 Cabraser identifies this approach in cases from the First, Fifth, 
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits,129 but she concludes that the Seventh 
122.  Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013). 
123.  Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013). 
124.  Cabraser, supra note 2, at 769. 
125.  Id. at 764-65, 768. See also Mullenix, supra note 16, at 531 (noting that the Wal-Mart 
dissenters “accurately” argued that the Court’s new approach to Rule 23(a)(2) “mimicked the more 
stringent predominance standard of rule 23(b)”). 
126.  Cabraser, supra note 2, at 762; see also id. at 767, 773-74, 792. 
127.  Id. at 770. 
128.  Id. at 771. 
129.  Id. at 770-75.  
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Circuit has been particularly influential and has emerged as “a leading 
class action court, most notably in decisions authored by Judge Richard 
Posner.”130 Cabraser also discusses contemporary class action decisions 
from these circuits, noting that many have permitted class actions to 
proceed and that others have recognized principles favorable to class 
litigation, including (1) the viability of issues classes;131 (2) that proof of 
injury need not be established at certification;132 and (3) that cy pres 
remedies may be appropriate in some class cases.133 Cabraser stresses 
that post-Wal-Mart and post-Comcast, the path to class certification is 
“more rigorous, more protracted, more expensive, and more 
uncertain,”134 but she concludes that the class action has survived and 
that its “core functions” and “fundamental structure” remain largely 
unchanged.135 
Attorney Eric Alan Isaacson concludes, in The Roberts Court and 
Securities Class Actions: Reaffirming Basic Principles, that the Roberts 
Court has removed all doubts about the validity of the fraud-on-the-
market theory and that it has relaxed considerably the degree of market 
efficiency that plaintiffs must establish.136 Isaacson acknowledges gains 
for the open-market securities class action in the Roberts Court’s 
decisions in Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton, Inc. (Halliburton 
I)137 and Amgen, Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust
Funds,138 before focusing primarily on the Court’s 6-3 decision in 
Halliburton Corp. v. Erica P. John Fund (Halliburton II), in which the 
Court reaffirmed the fraud-on-the-market theory.139 Isaacson hales 
Halliburton I, in which the Court unanimously rejected the requirement 
that plaintiffs establish “loss causation” as a prerequisite to class 
certification, as a “clear victory” for plaintiffs.140 He acknowledges also 
the significance of the Amgen decision, in which the Court concluded 
that “proof of materiality” is not a prerequisite to class certification 
 130.  Indeed, Cabraser identifies decisions of Judge Posner as creating a “21st Century 
jurisprudence of class certification.” Id. at 776. See also id. (listing pre- and post-Wal-Mart and 
Comcast decisions of Judge Posner). 
131.  Id. at 780-83 
132.  Id. at 763, 775-77, 779-84 
133.  Id. at 776, 797-99 (discussing two opinions by Judge Posner, one of which approved and 
one of which disapproved a cy pres remedy). 
134.  Id. at 800. 
135.  Id. at 800-01. 
136.  Isaacson, supra note 38, at 960. 
137.  Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. (Halliburton I), 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011). 
138.  Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2011). 
139.  Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014). 
140.  Isaacson, supra note 38, at 6, 946-47. 
718 AKRON LAW REVIEW [48:697 
because “materiality” presents a common question that will not vary 
among class members.141 
Isaacson, however, focuses primarily on Halliburton II, in which 
the Roberts Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, reaffirmed 
adherence to the fraud-on-the-market theory in open-market securities 
class actions. This permits plaintiffs to use a rebuttable presumption that 
class members relied on material misrepresentations in publicly 
available information.142 The Halliburton II Court also, however, 
permitted defendants to oppose class certification with evidence that the 
allegedly misleading statements and omissions did not affect the market 
price. Isaacson concludes that Halliburton II is important, first, because 
it legitimizes the fraud-on-the-market theory and, second, because the 
Court endorsed a flexible notion of fraud-on-the-market.143 
The Supreme Court’s decision regarding the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption in Basic Inc. v. Levinson144 was both controversial and 
ambiguous. Isaacson emphasizes that Halliburton II resolves both 
failings. The Basic decision was controversial, Isaacson reminds, 
because three conservative justices did not participate in the decision.145 
Of the remaining six justices, the four “rather liberal” justices – Justices 
Blackman, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens – formed the majority in 
support of the fraud-on-the-market theory, while two “relatively 
moderate conservatives,” Justices White and O’Connor, dissented.146 
Isaacson concludes that Halliburton II, a 6-3 decision authored by Chief 
Justice Roberts, provides the legitimacy to the fraud-on-the-market 
theory that eluded the Basic decision because Basic was decided by a 
“dubiously liberal” majority of only four justices.147 Furthermore, 
Isaacson emphasizes that Chief Justice Roberts’s Halliburton II opinion 
is premised on “relatively modest ideas of ‘market efficiency’” and that 
its flexible concept of market efficiency will have significant impacts on 
securities class actions at the class certification stage, but also at other 
stages of the litigation, including the pleadings stage, the motion practice 
141.  Id. at 947, 951-52. 
 142.  This presumption obviates the need for plaintiffs to establish the state of mind of 
individual class members, which might preclude class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) on the basis 
that individual reliance issues predominated over common issues. Id. at 953. 
143.  Id. at 954-60. 
144.  Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
145.  Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia recused, and Justice Kennedy was sworn in 
after the oral argument in the case. Isaacson, supra note 38, at 938. 
146.  Id. at 925, 933-34. 
147.  Id. at 948, 954-55, 960-62. 
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stage, summary judgment, and trial.148 
Isaacson emphasizes that the Halliburton II Court rejected 
arguments that market efficiency is a “binary, yes or no” decision. It 
acknowledged the Basic Court’s conclusion that “markets for some 
securities are more efficient than the markets for others” and that “even a 
single market can process different kinds of information more or less 
efficiently, depending on how widely the information is disseminated 
and how easily it is understood.”149 Isaacson concludes that the 
Halliburton II Court’s “modest” concept of “market efficiency,” 
combined with the Court’s rejection of any suggestion that plaintiffs 
must establish “price impact,” should lead to the overturning of many 
lower court decisions that disposed of plaintiffs’ securities class actions 
as a matter of law, based on requirements that the plaintiffs had to 
establish “almost perfect efficiency.”150 Indeed, Isaacson concludes that 
Halliburton II’s affirmation of a flexible understanding of market 
efficiency will result in rejection of court decisions that deny class 
certification as a matter of law or that dismiss securities class action 
litigation, as a matter of law, at the pleadings or summary judgment 
stage.151 He emphasizes that, under the Halliburton II approach to 
market efficiency, price effects are ultimately questions of fact ill-suited 
to determination “as a matter of law.”152 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Roberts Court has decided more cases regarding the class 
action in the last ten years than the Supreme Court has decided in any 
148.  Id. at 948. See infra note 150-151, and accompanying text. 
 149.  Isaacson, supra note 38, at 957 (quoting Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. 
(Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2410 (2014) (quoting Basic, 485 U.S. at 246-47 n.24)). 
150.  Id. at 960-62. Isaacson, thus, foresees that the more flexible definition of efficiency in 
Halliburton II will lead to the following changes in securities class action practice: (1) Halliburton 
II will render invalid lower court definitions regarding market efficiency that require “all 
information to be fully reflected in price at all times, id. at 962, 966-67; (2) Hallilburton II will 
overrule decisions dismissing claims on the pleadings, if information was available from any source 
before public statements were made, based on prior lower court conclusions that an efficient market 
must instantaneously incorporate all information, id. at 967-68; (3) Halliburton II suggests that 
courts will begin accepting the fraud-on-the-market presumption in cases involving initial public 
offerings, id. at 968; (4) Halliburton II will likely overrule lower court decisions requiring plaintiffs 
to produce sophisticated statistical models or “event studies” to demonstrate the efficiency of 
actively traded securities, id. at 972-74; and (5) by putting on defendants the burden of disproving 
price impact, Halliburton II shifts the uncertainty produced by “confounding factors” from plaintiffs 
to defendants and will require defendants to establish that a particular misrepresentation did not 
affect market price, id. at 974-77. 
151.  Id. at 977. 
152.  Id. at 959. 
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decade since the 1966 overhaul of Rule 23. From the contributions to 
this symposium on The Class Action After a Decade of Roberts Court 
Decisions, it is clear that the Court’s decisions do not uniformly favor 
the plaintiff or the defendant. Nevertheless, several important themes 
emerge from close study of the decisions. 
The symposium contributors perceive that the Court has construed 
provisions of Rule 23 to make class certification less available and has 
heightened the proof required at the certification stage with the result 
that class certification is much more time-consuming, expensive, and 
difficult to obtain. As a pragmatic matter, however, the articles reveal 
that courts are still certifying employment class actions alleging 
intentional discrimination and Rule 23(b)(3) damage class actions, in 
general, particularly in circuits that have traditionally favored class 
litigation. Moreover, although the number of nationwide suits has ebbed, 
the cases have resurrected as smaller, regional class actions or as 
individual suits that are filed in multiple federal and state forums. From 
this result, one commentator suggests a federalism defense for the 
Roberts Court’s narrow construction of class certification under Rule 23 
and suggests also that the Supreme Court should perceive the class 
certification decision as at the limits of its lawmaking authority. To a 
person, those who commented on the Court’s securities class action 
decisions observed quite hospitable treatment of class actions alleging 
securities fraud. By contrast, the majority of those commenting on the 
Roberts Court treatment of class action waivers in arbitration agreements 
concluded that the decisions liberally enable defendants to avoid 
negative value claims, which, absent aggregate action, will not be 
pursued. In other decisions, the Roberts Court provided particularized 
guidance regarding class action issues. 
The decisions, though numerous, provide no overarching theory of 
the class action, nor should they. A primary lesson to be learned from 
these decisions – one that is taught repeatedly in the procedural area – is 
that issues of institutional capacity inevitably come to the fore. The 
Supreme Court cannot, through the adjudicative process, create a 
comprehensive framework for class action procedure. It is constrained, 
instead, to resolve issues presented in the cases before it. More 
comprehensive policymaking regarding class procedure must come from 
Congress or the federal rulemakers. The many Roberts Court class 
action decisions will, nevertheless, have a profound influence on the 
future of class litigation. While no overarching theory may be extracted 
from the Roberts Court treatment of Rule 23, observers on both sides of 
the bar can agree on one issue: The class action remains alive and well. 
